THE GEOPOLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHOKEPOINT WARFARE: ASSESSING SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENERGY SUPPLY CHAIN RESILIENCE IN THE 2026 HORMUZ CRISIS

Abstract

The 2026 crisis in Hormuz is a pivotal point of change in the development of maritime security and world political economy. This study looks into the case of the Dual Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, when Iran single-handedly closed the waterway, followed by the counter-blockade by the West, as a paradigm shift in the chokepoint warfare. This paper explores the overlap between kinetic maritime threats and global energy and agricultural supply chains resilience using a qualitative-descriptive research design. The paper concludes that the combination of asymmetric technology, such as Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs), smart mines and GNSS jamming, has rendered traditional naval deterrence models obsolete. Moreover, the crisis shows that the critical infrastructure, including desalination and port facilities, is increasingly a target in maritime conflict not only due to energy-related issues but according to the Fertilizer-Food-Energy Nexus. The study adds to the body of literature by reconstituting the concept of maritime security in an ecocentric fashion, in that post-hegemonic maritime governance has to discontinue force-projection as the means of its operations, but instead such governance should target the systemic protection of critical infrastructure. The results of the study indicate that the combination of economic leverage and the tactical security infrastructure in the war on the grey zone presupposes a radical change in the international maritime standards and global supply chain risk management.

Keywords: Strait of Hormuz, Chokepoint Warfare, Global Political Economy, Maritime Security, Asymmetric warfare, Energy Resilience, Green Theory, Dual blockade.