BEYOND ARGUMENTS: FITRAH AS A PRE‑DISCURSIVE AWARENESS OF THE DIVINE
Abstract
This paper explores the concept of fitrah—the innate, God‑given disposition that orients humans toward belief in the Divine—as an epistemic foundation for theism independent of inferential arguments. Drawing on Qur’anic and Hadith texts, classical Islamic thinkers (al‑Ghazali, Ibn Taymiyya, Saʿd al‑Din al‑Taftazani, Shah Waliullah), and contemporary philosophy of religion, the study reconstructs a model of fitrah as a form of pre‑discursive, properly fundamental belief in God. It situates fitrah within broader epistemological debates about evidentialism and fundamental beliefs, compares it with Alvin Plantinga’s sensus divinitatis, and examines empirical findings from developmental psychology and cognitive science that suggest humans naturally favor purposive explanations and dualist intuitions. The paper contends that fitrah provides a rational, warranted basis for theistic belief, not through syllogistic proofs but through the proper functioning of innate cognitive faculties. By distinguishing fitrah from formal arguments, the research highlights its role as a non‑inferential source of knowledge. It proposes a framework for understanding belief in God that honors both revelation and reason.
Keywords. Fitrah; Theism; Innate Disposition; Islamic Epistemology; Basic Belief; Alvin Plantinga; Intuitive Theism; Cognitive Science; Ibn Taymiyya; Taftazani; Shah Waliullah.
