The Paradox of Stability: How Non-Proliferation Failures Reinforce Nuclear Deterrence

Abstract

The focus of this research is the paradox of failure of nuclear non-proliferation and the paradox of success of nuclear deterrence. Despite the fact that the global non-proliferation regime which is centered on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been unsuccessful in stopping both horizontal and vertical proliferation, the failure to do so has, paradoxically, buttressed deterrence stability among nuclear states. This paper posits that selective non-compliance, the erosion of the non-proliferation norms, and the inequitable application of the non-proliferation regime have led states to depend on nuclear deterrence more as a means of preserving their existence and their strategic autonomy. Proliferation failures have not yielded a systemic collapse; instead, they have bolstered deterrence thinking by causing states to act more prudently, to improve their second strike capabilities, and to heighten mutual vulnerability which is often referred to as ‘the paradox of mutual vulnerability’ or ‘the vulnerability paradox’ among competing states. This study applies deterrence theory in conjunction with a number of contemporary examples to demonstrate the fear sustaining stability that non-proliferation failures do not come with legally imposed constraints. This study illustrates the paradox of deterrence that the normative decline of global non-proliferation has illustrated so starkly. In addition, the study goes beyond the assumptions of liberal institutionalism.

Keywords: Nuclear Deterrence; Non-Proliferation Regime; Strategic Stability; NPT; Security Dilemma.